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Organizations create networks with one another, and these networks may in turn shape
the organizations involved. Until recently, such complex dynamic processes could not
be rigorously empirically analyzed because of a lack of suitable modeling and validation
methods. Using stochastic actor-oriented models and unique longitudinal survey data
on the changing structure of interfirm production networks in the automotive industry
in Japan, this paper illustrates how to quantitatively assess and validate (1) the dynamic
micro-mechanism by which organizations form their networks and (2) the role of the
dynamic network structures in organizational performance. The applied model helps to
explain the endogenous processes behind the recent diversification of Japanese
automobile production networks. Specifically, testing the effects of network topology
and network diffusion on organizational performance, the novel modeling framework
enables us to discern that the restructuring of interorganizational networks led to the
increase of Japanese automakers’ production per employee, and not the reverse.
Traditional models that do not allow for interaction between interorganizational
structure and organizational agency misrepresent this mechanism.
Keywords: Stochastic actor-oriented models, Interorganizational network evolution,
Interorganizational network diffusion, Model validation, Japanese production networksIntroduction
It has been recognized that the system of industrial production cannot be realistically
reduced to the behavior of individual organizations, quantifiable by traditional atomistic
approaches. Network conceptualizations of interorganizational relationships have become
widely accepted (Borgatti and Foster 2003; Lomi and Pattison 2006; Trapido 2013; van de
Bunt and Groenewegen 2007). It has also been recognized that interorganizational net-
works are not stationary and that individual relationships do not exist in isolation. In
other words, interorganizational networks evolve, and their structure influences their
own dynamics (Ahuja et al. 2009; Gulati and Gargiulo 1999; Madhavan et al. 1998). How-
ever, methods used in empirical research on interorganizational networks still generally
require the troubling assumption that outcomes or network structures are endogenousThe Author(s). 2017 Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
icense (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
rovided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and
ndicate if changes were made.
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2011; Lomi and Pallotti 2012; van de Bunt and Groenewegen 2007).
Since the first studies in the field, networks in organizational research have traditionally
been treated either as independent variables explaining organizational outcomes or, less
often, as dependent variables of organizational processes (Ahuja et al. 2009, Borgatti and
Foster 2003). Until recently, the available tools were unable to simultaneously treat
dynamic networks as both dependent and independent variables in organizational pro-
cesses, and therefore, researchers had to adopt one of two perspectives: either assume
environmental/structural determinism or emphasize organizational strategy and individual
agency.
Using an example of dissolving Japanese keiretsu networks, the aim of this paper is
to illustrate one way in which these two perspectives in organizational research can be
united, thereby allowing dynamic analyses of organizations that both shape and are
shaped by their networks. We utilize unique longitudinal survey data on supply rela-
tionships among Japanese automobile manufactures and apply novel model validation
tests to demonstrate how to rigorously assess (1) the dynamic mechanism by which
interorganizational production networks are formed and (2) the role of the dynamic
network structures in organizational performance.Interorganizational structures and performance in Japanese automotive keiretsu
networks
The evolution of Japanese keiretsu networks
The choice of the empirical case for this article was motivated by reports of the chan-
ging structure of keiretsu networks in the Japanese automobile manufacturing sector
and speculation concerning the consequences of this change for the performance of the
sector (Shirouzu 2015). The automotive sector is a suitable target for learning about or-
ganizations in mature modern industries with vertically integrated production processes
(Lomi and Pattison 2006). We focus on the supply network aspect of the Japanese auto-
makers’ interorganizational networks because supply relationships are crucial for orga-
nizations, particularly automobile assemblers and manufacturers, that subcontract a
large proportion of their production (Dyer 1996). Studying supply relationships allows
researchers to uncover the complex interorganizational structure of national produc-
tion systems (Sako 2004).
The keiretsu system is a special type of network organization of production that
allows the participating corporations to outsource essential tasks to interlinked long-
term partners that are “embedded” in strong relationships of mutual social obligations
(Granovetter 1985). The keiretsu system has been widely adopted by Japanese automo-
bile manufacturers and credited for the success of these corporations. In 1939, Toyota
organized its first-tier suppliers into an official association and refused to deal directly
with suppliers outside of this group. Toyota’s approach was supported by the Japanese
government and soon imitated by other Japanese automakers (Wada 1992). Logistics
and quality control were significantly simplified because parts were obtained exclusively
from a small number of proven intermediating partners. Such arrangements allowed
Japanese auto manufacturers to reduce lead times and manufacturing costs and achieve
high volumes of external production with very lean purchasing departments (Kamath
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resource procurement through a small number of mutually cooperating suppliers was
praised for its effective information-sharing, for reducing the costs of monitoring, and
for keeping associated revenues within a narrow circle of companies (Cooper and
Yoshikawa 1994; Handfield and Bechtel 2002; Holmstrom and Roberts 1998; Lamming
2000). Furthermore, close links among keiretsu suppliers were understood to prevent
their exploitation by overly powerful clients (Holmstrom and Roberts 1998).
After Japan fell into recession, some commentators predicted that keiretsu would
become even stronger in the harsher economic environment because of the net-
works’ role in diffusing risk. Others opined that the keiretsu model had become
outdated for a modern economy in which the challenge was no longer to secure
access to resources and maximize production but had shifted to competing for lim-
ited demand by increasing efficiency and lowering prices (Ahmadjian and Lincoln
2001; Lincoln and Gerlach 2004). Qualitative accounts suggest that keiretsu have
been yielding to market mechanisms and open competition in response to the shift
in global demand to price-conscious consumers in emerging markets. Reportedly,
some Japanese manufacturers have begun recommending that their suppliers de-
velop new links with customers from other trading groups instead of relying solely
on one main client (Lamming 2000).
Even the Toyota Group, the archetypal pioneer of the vertical keiretsu structure and
currently the most profitable and best-selling automaker in the world (Kubota 2015;
Toyota Motor Corporation 2014), is reportedly reconsidering the traditional arrange-
ment. The former vice-president of the group publicly criticized its keiretsu suppliers
for abusing their guaranteed exclusive position as brokers and for reselling parts pro-
duced cheaply by firms outside of the group at unjustifiably high margins (Shirouzu
2015). Reports have also emerged of interlinked suppliers colluding to drive their prices
beyond reasonable levels to inflate their revenues (Shirouzu and Shiraki 2014). The
need for lower procurement costs and less waste across the supply chain likely intensi-
fied during the global financial crisis, when safe haven demand inflated the value of the
Japanese currency. The Japanese yen strengthened from 120 yen per US dollar in 2006
to 76 yen in 2011, making cars produced in Japan more expensive on global markets.
This research is based on data from Japanese automakers during this turbulent period
(2006–2011).Intermediation, closure, embeddedness, and performance
Most of the available research on the role of interorganizational keiretsu networks ap-
pears to focus solely on their structure without examining how the networks affect the
economic performance of their members (Ingram and Simons 2002, Khanna and Yafeh
2005). Identifying affiliation with a keiretsu group is not straightforward (Yafeh 2002).
Keiretsu groups are generally characterized by dense relationships among a set of com-
panies, and the extent of a firm’s connections to other members of the group defines
the firm’s affiliation. The distinguishing characteristic of keiretsu supply structures is
that firms obtain components and materials via a limited number of long-term partners
in their business group that function as intermediaries, rather than reaching out dir-
ectly to numerous original producers.
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smaller number of long-term intermediaries (Hoetker et al. 2007). From the perspective
of disaster resilience, more extensive supply networks may experience more shocks but
recover faster (Todo 2016). From the perspective of innovativeness, interacting only
with long-term partners may lead to cognitive lock-in (Gargiulo and Benassi 2000).
Moreover, having few trading partners decreases a firm’s autonomy. However, strong
and trusting relationships between buyers and sellers may be preferable when low-
modularity parts must be supplied, which may require close cooperation and risk-sharing
in customizing each model (Hoetker et al. 2007). A lack of modularity may be one of the
reasons that keiretsu networks were traditionally much stronger in the Japanese automo-
tive industry than in the electronics industry (Lincoln and Gerlach 2004). In the electric
machinery industry, standardized parts can frequently be bought off the shelf, and major
Japanese electronics producers are reportedly more inclined than automakers to deal at
arms’ length with a large base of suppliers (Asanuma 1989).
Yang and Babich (2015) note that intuition suggests that utilizing intermediaries for
procurement should be the correct choice because of the superior knowledge that these
intermediates possess regarding real supply costs. Intermediaries that match with mul-
tiple suppliers and multiple buyers improve supply chain performance, according to
Belavina and Girotra (2012), by facilitating the adaptation of the supplier base to the
buyers’ needs and by providing sufficient levels of business to the suppliers. However,
these advantages do not apply when an intermediary (e.g., a first-tier supplier) serves
only one client (the automobile assembler). Firms and entire industries in intermediary
brokerage positions can exploit their partners through the market power that such po-
sitions provide (Talmud 1994). From the “structural holes” perspective (Burt 2000), it
appears rational for firms that are connected only through an intermediary to “close”
such holes by direct connections, but the dynamics of such network processes have
rarely been investigated in the context of supply chains (Ryall and Sorenson 2007).
It is not well understood whether it is beneficial for an organization to focus its
supply relationships on a small number of intermediating partners within its own
business group or to diversify its relationships to a variety of organizations. The most
robust (although not unchallenged) empirical evidence seems to favor the view that a
major function of business groups in Japan in the 20th century was risk sharing and
revenue redistribution from high-performing firms to partners experiencing tempor-
ary difficulties (Khanna and Yafeh 2005). Using more recent data, He et al. (2013)
support this view of the function of business groups in China, showing that the diffu-
sion of shocks within groups decreases a given member firm’s risk of default.
In summary, two important streams of theoretical views can be found in the literature
on interfirm networks. The first stream is based on conventional economic market theory
and posits that markets consist of dynamic arm’s-length transactions between independ-
ent organizations. According to this view, it is efficient for firms to distribute their
resource transactions over a large number of partners and frequently change these part-
ners as needed (Baker 1990). This position is also consistent with resource-dependency
theory, as it is considered rational not to depend on any single organization but rather
maintain access to a large number of substitutable partners (Uzzi 1996).
As a reaction to these under-socialized economic views of interorganizational relation-
ships, economic sociologists have proposed a social network view of interorganizational
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nizations, which were neglected in the original economic views of the market or consid-
ered only in their dyadic form in transaction cost economics (Romo and Schwartz 1995).
Uzzi (1996) demonstrated that it may be beneficial for firms to develop strong relation-
ships “embedded” in a dense network of transactions among a small number of long-term
partners. The advantage of exclusive long-term relationships to organizations embedded
in close-knit groups is trust, transfer of fine-grained information, and joint problem-
solving arrangements. Cliques of embedded ties provide opportunities for resource pool-
ing, cooperation, coordinated adaption, and the induction of network partners to share
economic benefits (Uzzi 1996). White (1981) proposed that in competitive production
markets, we should observe interfirm structures to gravitate toward dense cliques of pro-
ducers watching each other.
Despite their labels, both “the network” and “the market” theoretical view of interorga-
nizational transactions can be conceptualized as networks. In embedded organizational
networks, links have longer duration, the number of partners is smaller and they tend to
be densely interconnected with each other. In conventionally conceived ideal markets,
links are considered highly dynamic, and actors may directly access any number of part-
ners through arms’ length transactions. Regardless their dynamicity and structure, both
arrangements and their consequences for performance can be rigorously empirically
analyzed with network methods.
Although it may not be clear whether an arm’s-length market approach or a closed-
network approach is more efficient, theories predict that in one market, firms will copy
the strategies of their more successful partners and that the whole system will therefore
converge toward the more efficient arrangement (Uzzi 1996).Unbundling interorganizational network effects
Endogenous network evolution
A firm may be more likely to conduct business with another firm if the two already
have common business partners (Matous and Todo 2014). Embedded ties emerge from
such third-party referral networks, which transfer expectations of behavior from exist-
ing embedded relationships to newly matched firms (Uzzi 1996). Firms may also prefer
suppliers that have no trading relationships with one another to prevent collusion. If
such tendencies exist, interorganizational network structure effectively constrains its
own evolution (Koskinen et al. 2015; Stuart 1998). The effects of interorganizational
network structure on its own evolution is worth exploring in its own right, but it is also
a source of endogeneity that must be controlled for in studying the relationship
between the dynamics of networks and their outcomes (Ahuja et al. 2011). Further-
more, network dynamics may be influenced by suppliers’ and clients’ revenue dynamics.
Assemblers with greater sales volumes may have to expand their supply chains, and
more financially successful suppliers may be more attractive. Similarity in performance
may also matter – successful companies may tend to cluster together – and researchers
should also control for such a possibility.
Causality may operate in both directions. Changing performance may influence net-
works, which may in turn influence performance. If revenue and the number of sup-
pliers are correlated, it may be that the supply network structure is the source of the
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is challenging but important. If certain types and shapes of interorganizational net-
works are found to be associated with high organizational performance, it is important
to understand whether it is a case of, for example, a certain type of supply network
structure stimulating revenues (which would be a recommendable strategy for other
ambitious firms to replicate), or whether only firms that are already successful tend to
consequently reshape their supply chains in a certain manner (which would not neces-
sarily provide practical lessons for other companies).Network consequences: topology versus flows
Organizational researchers explain network effects in terms of either topology or flows
(Borgatti and Foster 2003). Within the former (“structuralist”) tradition, actors’ per-
formance is examined in relation to the patterns of their ties to others (while neglecting
the characteristics of the actors’ partners) (e.g., Burt 2000). Within the latter (“connec-
tionist”) tradition, network links are conceptualized as conduits along which influence
flows between the partners and the focal actor (e.g., Davis and Greve 1997). Whereas
structuralists are concerned with the shape of networks around focal actors (e.g., is the
number of suppliers related to performance?), connectionists are concerned with influ-
ence the of the partners’ characteristics on the focal actor’s characteristics (e.g., does
suppliers’ performance affect clients’ performance?). In the present study, we address
both perspectives on network consequences, while controlling for endogeneity.Hypotheses
Based on the reviewed network theories of interorganizational transactions, we formu-
late the following hypotheses regarding the structural embeddedness of interfirm rela-
tions (Uzzi 1996).
The first hypothesis concerns the dynamics of interfirm network evolution (H1):
“Firms will prefer to maintain relations with established partners within their cliques.”
The second hypothesis concerns the relations between interfirm network topology
and organizational performance (H2): “Firms that focus their transactions in a small
number of important relationships will outperform firms that spread their transactions
among a larger number of partners.”
The third hypothesis regards the flows of support between firms and organizational
performance (H3): The relationships between firms are not purely transactional but
facilitate learning and include transfer of important information and support in times
of need. Therefore, connections with successful firms will increase the probability of
good performance and decrease the probability of bad performance in the long term.Supply network data and firm performance measures
The analysis in this paper is based on trade interactions among the largest 100 firms
(in terms of employees) primarily involved in the automobile sector in Japan (class 301
in the Japan Standard Industrial Classification, Rev. March 2002, at the three-digit level,
which corresponds to 311 in the present classification). The largest manufacturers were
selected based on how many employees they had in 2006. Such a selection of organiza-
tions that spans market boundaries has been described as an organizational community
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regarding their transaction partners. The informants were asked to name up to 24
of their main suppliers or buyers of goods or services. No other details about the
interactions (such as the volumes of the transactions) were requested. The focus of
this analysis is not the link content but whether major Japanese automotive firms
distribute their business among many peers or only a few. Links to companies out-
side the top 100 firms within the industry are not considered in the present ana-
lysis. We use revenue per employee (RPE) and return on sales (ROS) as two
measures of firm performance. For both measures of performance, we are inter-
ested in how supply network structures and the type of suppliers (e.g., labor-
intensive original producers versus intermediates) relate to longer-term changes in
clients’ performance.
First, we discuss RPE as a measure of performance. Naturally, larger firms are more
likely to have larger revenues. Therefore, to analyze trends in the performance of firms
of unequal sizes, RPE is used in this paper. Although RPE does not exactly measure the
efficiency of a firm’s operations, increasing revenue trends for the same company can
be generally interpreted as a performance improvement and decreasing revenues as a
performance deterioration. However, caution is necessary when comparing the perfor-
mances of firms in terms of RPE. Even within the same industry, RPE also reflects the
type of business in which the firm is involved, including whether the firm is production
or trade oriented. For example, upstream firms that manufacture their products intern-
ally are likely to have lower RPE because such production is labor-intensive. By con-
trast, trading firms and official first-tier suppliers that resell products manufactured by
other firms are likely to have higher RPE.
For a given company in a certain line of business, an expansion of sales per employee
indicates a shift to higher production with less labor. However, without controlling for
all inputs, measuring only the change in outputs in relation to network dynamics does
not sufficiently inform us whether interorganizational network structures contribute to
operational efficiency. To estimate whether firms can increase their profits for a given
volume of production by restructuring the networks through which they procure the
parts required for this volume of production, we employ ROS.
Because the data do not include any information concerning the quantity of the
transactions, we cannot control for the overall amount of components purchased
through the supply chain to distinguish an increase in revenues from increased produc-
tion volumes from an increase in the value of each product. Therefore, we include ROS
as a measure of performance that adjusts for volumes.
RPE is characteristically skewed, and its natural log transformation is thus used in the
present analysis, which is common in firm-level econometric studies. Because it is pos-
sible to model only the probability of discrete changes in the present modeling frame-
work, log (revenues/employees) was rounded to the nearest integer value, which
yielded an RPE scale with three performance categories: low, middle, and high (Table 3).
For comparability, we also divided ROS in three categories according to the number of
cases in the low (negative profits), high (ROS above 3%), and middle categories (all
other firms), similar to the RPE scale. As a robustness check, we varied the number of
categories and the cut-off points, which did not substantially change the results pre-
sented here. The sample is described in Table 1.
Table 1 The revenues and number of employees of the 100 largest firms in the Japanese automobile
manufacturing sector
Min. Median Mean Max. NA
Revenues in 2006 [thousands of yen] 7.39*106 7.27*107 3.88*108 9.22*109 1
Revenues in 2011 [thousands of yen] 5.00*106 8.10*107 4.02*108 8.24*109 8
Employees in 2006 800 1395 4316 65994 0
Employees in 2011 630 1580 4862 69310 7
RPE in 2006 [thousands of yen/person] 7393 52390 61220 143900 1
RPE in 2011 [thousands of yen/person] 6098 48960 57980 20560 8
logRPE 2006 8.908 10.87 10.88 11.88 1
logRPE 2011 8.716 10.8 10.81 12.23 8
Profit in 2006 [thousands of yen] −5.26*108 1.50*106 6.12*106 5.29*108 2
Profit in 2011 [thousands of yen] −3.97*107 1.54*106 4.59*106 8.67*107 10
ROS in 2006 −0.452 0.019 0.013 0.088 2
ROS in 2011 −0.113 0.016 0.019 0.152 11
Number of suppliers in 2006 0 1 4.5 45
Number of suppliers in 2011 0 2 5.2 41
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correlated (R = 0.5, p < 0.01). However, it is not possible to discern from the observed
correlations alone whether accessing more suppliers leads to higher revenues, whether
more successful companies tend to subsequently expand their supply chain, or neither.
The methods introduced in the following section allow us to distinguish these
mechanisms.Stochastic actor-oriented network modeling
General introduction
Sophisticated statistical network models such as Exponential Random Graph
Models have been developed for the analysis of complex network structures (Rank
et al. 2010; Sosa et al. 2015; Trapido 2013) and applied to cross-sectional supply
network data (Lomi and Pattison 2006). These models quantify the statistical
prevalence of network micro-patterns, or “motifs” in networks. However, static
models applied to cross-sectional data cannot untangle the mechanism of
organizational behavior behind the dynamics of co-evolving interorganizational net-
works and organizational performance.
This study illustrates an application of dynamic models in which networks are gradually
longitudinally constructed bottom-up by actors (representing organizations) making deci-
sions concerning their organizational partners. This conceptualization corresponds to
real-world interorganizational networks (Ahuja et al. 2009). We introduce stochastic
actor-oriented models, which are statistical, parametric models of network evolution and
diffusion (Snijders et al. 2010). Stochastic actor-oriented models have been successfully
applied to interorganizational networks (van de Bunt and Groenewegen 2007). However,
these models have only recently been extended to cope with the complexity of bidirec-
tional interactions between networks and performance. Furthermore, stochastic actor-
oriented models have become capable of robust goodness-of-fit tests, which can guide the
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novel aspects, i.e., (1) the co-evolution of interorganizational networks and organizational
performance and (2) model validity, are emphasized in this article.
Variation of stochastic actor-oriented models has in recent years been applied to
several trade network studies (Manger and Pickup 2016; Manger et al. 2012,
Matous and Todo 2016, Prell and Feng 2016). For readers unfamiliar with the
fundamentals of this method, we provide a short general introduction in the
Appendix.Drivers of network and performance change
In stochastic actor-oriented models, network evolution is treated as a continuous-time
Markov chain of single trading-link changes between observations. Between observa-
tions, each organization may receive one or more opportunities in a random order to
change its suppliers by rearranging its outgoing ties, and the organization may also
move up or down on the RPE or ROS scale. The model includes “rate effects” that
regulate how frequently actors receive an opportunity to modify their outgoing ties and
the frequency of changes in RPE or ROS. These rate effects depend on the number of
observed changes in the data. Only one actor acts at a time, and coordination is not
allowed. It is possible to allow actors with more links to make more changes in their
networks, but this option did not improve the fit of the models in the present case.
The parsimonious models presented here converged perfectly even without including
such degree-dependent rate effects.
Each firm chooses its suppliers according to an objective function in which the
desirability of each network configuration x is expressed from the viewpoint of
actor i – as in generalized linear models – as a combination of hypothetically rele-
vant network features fi(β, x) = ∑kβkski(x). A random component with a standard
Gumbel distribution is added to the evaluation function. This component is in-
cluded to respect the stochastic character of network evolution, which is a result
of influences that are unrepresented by nodal or dyadic variables and of measure-
ment errors. Thus, the actor does not necessarily choose the state with the highest
utility, but such a choice is the most likely. When a firm has an opportunity to
change its suppliers, the options are to create one new tie, delete one existing tie,
or do nothing. An analogous but separate function is used to express the likeli-
hood of an increase or decrease in RPE or ROS. This process enables us to untan-
gle what comes first: network change or performance change?
Each effect ski in the model corresponds to possible reasons that a change in the or-
ganization’s network or performance might occur. These network evolution effects
describe the organization’s network behavior, which considers the influence of the
existing network structure and other organizations’ performance. The performance
evolution effects describe the possible effects of the supply network’s structure on
revenues. The preference for certain network patterns need not be conscious—actors
may not be aware that they create network triangles when selecting suppliers that
were recommended to them by their partners—the estimated effects merely quantify
a statistical regularity. The explanations and mathematical formulas of effects ski are
presented in Table 2.
Table 2 Formulas for ski(x) selection effects in network x for ego i and alter j, other actors h, and
actors’ attributes v. In the actor-oriented modeling framework, network links are directed from clients,
who make the procurement decisions, to the suppliers that they select. Dashed arrows signify trading
relationships that are likely to be created and maintained if the effect is positive
Effect name (Additional description) Mathematical formula Graphical
representation
1. Network dynamics
1.1. Endogenous trade network interdependencies
Network→ network
Reciprocity (Favor firms that
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Table 2 Formulas for ski(x) selection effects in network x for ego i and alter j, other actors h, and
actors’ attributes v. In the actor-oriented modeling framework, network links are directed from clients,
who make the procurement decisions, to the suppliers that they select. Dashed arrows signify trading
relationships that are likely to be created and maintained if the effect is positive (Continued)
Network→ performance
(A) Topology:
















Note: xij = 1 if there is a directed tie from i to j and 0 otherwise
b simz is the mean of all similarity scores, which are
defined as simzij ¼
Δ− zi−zjj j
Δ with Δ =max|zi − zj|
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Parameter estimates can be used to compare how attractive various network configura-
tions are and the likelihood of any change in performance while controlling for other
exogenous and endogenous effects. The sign of βk indicates the likely direction of net-
work or revenue change, and the relative magnitudes can be interpreted similarly to
parameters of multinomial logistic regression models in terms of the log-probabilities
of changes among which the actors can choose. Specifically, the estimates are the log
odds ratios of procuring parts from a supplier described by the effect or a one-step im-
provement in performance on the RPE or ROS scale. Although it is possible to allow
different values of βk for creating new links and maintaining old links (e.g., to capture
the inertia of maintaining old interorganizational relationships), this distinction did not
improve the fit of the presented models, suggesting that the relationships were rela-
tively fluid in the observed period.
In summary, the model uncovers the network “microdynamics” (Ahuja et al. 2011), i.e.,
the actors’ tendencies to create and maintain certain network micro-patterns. This
process is distinct from statistically assessing only the prevalence of such patterns in the
data. For example, the presence of cohesive groups is typically expressed in network terms
as a high presence of triangles (i.e., partners of partners are also partners). However, the
changing number of triangles alone might not be always driven by the actors’ preference
for partners from the same trading clique. Different micro-mechanisms can produce simi-
lar patterns in the data. Trivially, the number of incidental triangles will increase with
more trading links in the network. Alternatively, there may be substantially important rea-
sons for the changing numbers of basic network motifs. For example, if most firms across
the network seek the best supplier regardless of keiretsu boundaries, the best supplier will
emerge as a new hub to which many nodes are connected. Thus, many firms in the net-
work will be connected in two steps through the hub. Then, any new links between clients
of this hub will create triangles, even if these new links were not motivated by the pres-
ence of this mutual business partner. By iteratively simulating the network evolution with
actors’ varying supply chain management strategies (such as the preference for popular
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that most faithfully replicate observable reality.Simulation and model validation
The estimation of stochastic actor-oriented models can be executed in the RSiena pack-
age in R software (Ripley et al. 2016). The method of moments, which depends on
thousands of iterative computer simulations of the change process, is used to estimate
the parameters βk that enable the reproduction of interorganizational network evolu-
tion within the observed period. There is one target statistic for each estimated effect
(for example, the number of ties in the network corresponds to the outdegree effect,
the number of reciprocated ties corresponds to the reciprocity effect, and the amount
of change in the network corresponds to the rate function). The presented models all
converge with T-ratios, quantifying the deviations between the simulated and observed
values of the target statistics, between −0.1 and 0.1, with the overall maximum conver-
gence ratios below 0.2, indicating excellent model convergence (Ripley et al. 2016). In
the final stage of the simulation, the standard errors of the estimated parameters
are computed by the finite difference method, based on the sensitivity of the target
statistics to βk.
Statistical models must be evaluated after parameter estimation, and goodness of fit
must be assessed. Without goodness of fit assessment, the reliability of all models, in-
cluding stochastic actor-oriented models, is doubtful. We assess the overall validity of
the model by the goodness of fit of the simulated networks’ macro-characteristics. We
compare the goodness of fit of the simulated networks and the actual networks at time
2 in terms of indegree distribution (i.e., the distribution of the number of clients), out-
degree distribution (i.e., the distribution of the number of suppliers), geodesic distance
distribution (quantifying the overall connectivity of the network), and triadic census
(quantifying the distribution of all combinations of directed triangles in the network).
The violin plots (Hintze and Nelson 1998) in Fig. 1 represent the kernel density distri-
bution of the statistic, and the red lines depict the cumulative distribution of the observed
values. The dotted gray lines designate a point-wise 90% relative frequency band for the
simulated data. Qualitatively, the fit is considered acceptable if the observed values (red
lines) fall within this region. The overall fit of each diagram is also quantitatively summa-
rized in terms of p-values below the diagrams, which were obtained by combining the
vector of statistics using Mahalanobis distance. Values above 0.05 indicate acceptable fit.
Standard labeling is used for the classes of the triad census (Wasserman and Faust 1994),
which is scaled and centered to maximize the visibility. Only the goodness of fit of the
ROS Flow model is presented in the figure for illustration. The diagrams for the other
three models presented in this paper display similarly good fit.Resulting model
The effects that needed to be included in the model to correctly reproduce the ob-
served network dynamics are explained in Table 2. The reciprocity effect in Section
1.1. of Table 2 represents a fundamental tendency of many real-life networks to
reciprocate links among actors (Wasserman 1980). Reciprocity is common even in
supply chains, which were traditionally understood as linear chain-like entities, in
Fig. 1 a Distribution of the number of clients per firm; b distribution of the number of suppliers per firm;
c geodesic distance distribution; d triadic census
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typically more likely to obtain resources mutually from one another than from a
random, unrelated organization in the dataset.
Transitive triplets, three-cycles, and common supplier effects represent different
types of transitive closure or clique formation in directed networks. The number of
partners that two interlinked organizations have in common reflects the structural em-
beddedness of their relationship (van de Bunt and Groenewegen 2007). A potential
supplier may be preferred if other business partners also use the supplier. The formulas
for the transitive closure effects in Table 2 quantify how many triangles are closed by a
link from i to j. The number of the respective types of triangles multiplied by the ob-
tained weights βk equals the utility such a link adds to the actor and translates into the
probability of creating and maintaining this link. The effect entitled “Number of
second-tier suppliers” tests whether organizations prefer suppliers that mediate access
to a large number of second-tier suppliers. Furthermore, organizations may imitate
other organizations in choosing their suppliers and prefer more central organizations
(Ahuja et al. 2009, Hoetker et al. 2007, Stuart 1998). Such tendencies are captured by
the indegree popularity effect. Indegree popularity quantifies “network-related status”
(van de Bunt and Groenewegen 2007) and controls for the preference to connect to
other popular organizations. In general network terms, this tendency is also called pref-
erential attachment and addresses the tendency of hubs to emerge in interorganiza-
tional data. Firms do not have resources to create an unlimited number of
interorganizational links (Ahuja et al. 2009). The outdegree effect controls for the num-
ber of links in the network. The effects in Section 1.2 of Table 2 jointly test whether
organizational performance influences network evolution. Finally, the effects in Section
2 control for the overall change in performance (“Baseline performance trend”) and for
the performance distribution among firms (“Quadratic performance trend”). The last
two effects assess the consequences of networks for organizational performance in
terms of (A) topology and (B) flow. By contrast, the topology effect tests whether
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(regardless of the suppliers’ performance); the flow effect tests whether partnering
organizations tend to converge in their performance.Results
Descriptive statistics
The changes in the supply networks and performance between 2006 and 2011 are
summarized in Table 3. Whereas 388 supply links remained unchanged, 169
changes occurred, including 131 newly created supply links and 38 severed links.
The overall supply network density among these 100 largest automobile firms in-
creased from 0.045 to 0.059, as the average number of suppliers of each firm
within the sample increased from 4.5 to 5.9. Six of the top 100 firms from 2006Table 3 Descriptive results: changes of suppliers between 2006 and 2011, distribution of firms by
revenue categories and by revenue dynamics
Count
Network dynamics
Whole network density in 2006 0.045
Whole network density in 2011a 0.059
Average number of suppliers in 2006 4.50
Average number of suppliers in 2011a 5.88
Preserved supply relationship 388
New suppliers 131
Abandoned suppliers 38
Total of changes 169
Jaccard index 0.697
Missing links in 2006 0%
Missing links in 2011 11.7%
RPE performance categories
Low revenue firms in 2006 (logRPE < 10.5) 21
Middle revenue firms in 2006 (10.5 < =logRPE < 11.5) 62
High revenue firms in 2006 (logRPE > =11.5) 16
NA in 2006 1
Low revenue firms in 2011 (logRPE < 10.5) 25
Middle revenue firms in 2011 (10.5 < =logRPE < 11.5) 55
High revenue firms in 2011 (logRPE > =11.5) 12
NA in 2011 8
ROS performance categories
Loss-making firms in 2006 (ROS < 0) 12
Middle return firms in 2006 (0 < =ROS < =0.03) 59
High return firms in 2006 (ROS > 0.03) 29
Loss-making firms in 2011 (ROS < 0) 27
Middle return firms in 2011 (0 < =ROS < =0.03) 48
High return firms in 2011 (ROS > 0.03) 25
aThe network metrics in this table were calculated after the imputation of 2006 values for the 11.7% missing
values in 2011
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limits tolerated in this modeling framework and should not impair the reliability of
the results (Ripley et al. 2016). The values for the links among the six firms were
imputed with values of the same dyads in the previous observation, i.e., links with
missing data were considered unchanged. Table 2 displays values based on the raw
data, whereas the metrics in Table 3 are calculated following imputation. In terms
of the RPE categories, 12 firms improved their ranks and 20 firms decreased their
ranks. In terms of the ROS categories, 24 firms improved their ranks and 39 firms
decreased their ranks.Modeling results
The effects describing the network dynamics are in the upper part of Table 4, and the
lower part of the table describes the performance dynamics. All these effects are jointly
considered in the model. The results for the network dynamics part of the model are
qualitatively similar for all the presented specifications. In the following discussion, we
illustrate the meaning of the estimates of network dynamics by citing the values of RPE
topological model unless otherwise noted.
First, we report the effects describing the endogenous network evolution in Part 1.1
of Table 4. As expected, the reciprocity effect is positively significant, which indicates
that bidirectional trade between pairs of firms is more common than expected by
chance, after controlling for other effects. In other words, a firm is more likely to pro-
cure goods or services from a firm that procures goods or services from it, ceteris pari-
bus. The estimates of the model can be interpreted in the same manner as the results
of a logistic regression. As previously explained, the objective function quantifies the
desirability of different interorganizational networking strategies (specifically, the log
odds of alternative supply chain configurations), and procuring goods from an existing
client increases the value of the objective function by 2.120 (Table 4, 1.1), indicating
that a firm that is given the opportunity will prefer to procure goods from a firm that
also procures goods from it with 8 to 1 odds, compared with otherwise equivalent alter-
natives (because e2.12 is approximately 8).
Next, three effects describe the tendency of actors to form triangular elements in the
supply networks by preferring to form and maintain links with partners from the same
cliques with many partners in common. The first two effects are transitive triplets and
three-cycles. The transitive triplets are triangular network motifs in which supplies flow
from one side to the other; the three-cycles represent cliques with cyclical flows. Both
effects are insignificant. Furthermore, the following negatively significant “same sup-
pliers” effect also operates against network closure. (This effect corresponds to the “bal-
ance” effect in the Siena modeling framework.) The negative estimate of this effect
indicates that firms were likely to abandon links to partners that procured supplies
from the same partners and that they sought firms that were not yet accessed by their
existing partners.
If firms preferred to retain suppliers from the same densely interconnected business
groups with many partners in common, we would expect the effects representing tran-
sitive closure (transitive triplets, three-cycles, same suppliers) to be positively signifi-
cant. Although network closure effects are typically important drivers of network
Table 4 Stochastic actor-oriented model: the network dynamics component of the model estimates
the log odds of procuring parts between a client and supplier embedded in network structures and
characterized by performance described by the estimated effects; the revenue dynamics component
of the model estimates the log odds of increasing productivity by one step on the RPE or ROS scale
RPE ROS


















1.1. Endogenous trade network interdependencies
Network→ network
Reciprocity 2.120* 0.308 2.151* 0.295 2.741* 0.252 2.204* 0.454
Transitive triplets 0.116 0.071 0.078 0.056 0.089 0.060 0.087 0.053
Three-cycles 0.139 0.135 0.150 0.143 0.153 0.144 0.153 0.154
Same suppliers −0.063* 0.025 −0.064* 0.023 −0.073* 0.027 −0.067* 0.020
Number of second-tier
suppliers
−0.137* 0.038 −0.138* 0.044 −0.132* 0.033 −0.121* 0.023
Indegree popularity 0.113* 0.027 0.116* 0.024 0.118* 0.024 0.117* 0.028
Outdegree −2.593* 0.356 −2.699* 0.314 −2.635* 0.337 −2.754* 0.212
1.2. Effects of firms’ performance z on supply network structures
Performance→ network
Client’s performance 1.135 1.303 −0.327 1.831 −0.982 1.361 −0.688 1.336
Supplier’s performance 0.049 0.461 0.029 0.774 0.206 0.445 0.195 0.624
Similarity in performance −3.022 1.776 −3.953 3.562 −1.451 1.587 −1.231 2.410
2. Performance dynamics
Baseline performance trend −0.673* 0.231 −0.174 0.180 −0.058 0.167 −0.051 0.194
Performance→ performance
Quadratic revenue trend −1.267* 0.373 −1.296* 0.470 −0.248 0.278 0.006 0.382
Network→ performance
Topology: The effect of the
number of suppliers on the
future performance trend
0.101* 0.033 −0.002 0.012




−0.217* 0.110 0.209 0.212
*p < 0.1
Matous and Todo Applied Network Science  (2017) 2:5 Page 16 of 24evolution (Ripley et al. 2016), none of the triadic effects were significant in the present
data. The lack of significance of the transitive closure and three-cycles and the negative
significance of the “same suppliers” indicate that it was possible during this period to
disconnect from organizations even if they had many partners in common and to con-
nect to otherwise unrelated suppliers in different cliques. The goodness-of-fit tests
show that the lack of cliquish tendencies is modeled correctly in the present simula-
tions (Fig. 1). The only significant effect related to transitive closure is the “number of
second-tier suppliers,” which is discussed next.
The effect “number of second-tier suppliers” is negatively significant and indi-
cates that organizations preferred to abandon intermediates that provided indirect
access to multiple second-tier suppliers. This result means that the more suppliers
that a firm has, the less attractive it becomes to other firms as a supplier. For ex-
ample, severing a contract with an intermediary that provides indirect access to
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scribes the log odds of different supply chain configurations. Thus, if an assembler
had to choose between (1) procuring supplies from an intermediate that buys parts
from 10 producers or (2) procuring directly from an original producer that has no
other suppliers in the network, the odds ratios of choosing option 2 versus option
1 would be exp(0*(−0.137)-10*(−0.137)), i.e., 3.9:1. In other words, if the two op-
tions were hypothetically equivalent in terms of all the other effects, the assembler
would choose the original producer instead of the intermediate, with an approxi-
mately 80% probability.
Both dismissing first-tier suppliers that broker access to many second-tier suppliers
and connecting directly with second-tier suppliers (thus converting them into first-tier
suppliers) decrease the number of second-tier suppliers and are thus supported by this
negatively significant effect. (These two ways in which the “number of second-tier sup-
pliers” effect operates are depicted by the two diagrams for this effect in Table 2.) Note
that, although the main transitive closure effects were not positively significant, creat-
ing links to second-tier suppliers may be an alternative micro-mechanism producing
transitive closure, if the original link to the first-tier supplier is also preserved. However,
creating a secondary path to a supplier previously accessed through a broker is less
likely than severing the contract with the broker for the following reasons. A new direct
link to a second-tier supplier contributes only 0.137 to the firm’s utility because this
link transforms the second-tier supplier into a first-tier supplier and, in turn, decreases
the number of second-tier suppliers by one. By contrast, severing the link with the bro-
ker contributes 0.137 multiplied by the number of the broker’s suppliers to the object-
ive function. Additionally, duplicate paths to the same suppliers via brokers are also
discouraged by the negative “same supplier” effect.
The firms in the sample sought the most popular suppliers with many clients, which
is captured by the indegree popularity effect.
From the joint results regarding the dynamics of interfirm network structures above,
we can state that the first structural embeddedness hypothesis (H1) is not supported.
The outdegree effect estimates and controls for the number of suppliers that firms in
the sample connected to within this period. The negative estimate is expected because
most firms procure supplies from only a small fraction of firms within the sample. A
procurement link becomes statistically likely only if the total log odds of a link become
greater than zero by the activation of other positive network effects, such as by con-
necting to a popular supplier.
The model also accounts for the potential influence of firms’ changing performance
on their subsequent supply chain management strategy and on their attractiveness as
suppliers, i.e., for the possibility that similarity (or dissimilarity) in performance
between two firms may influence the probability of trade between them. These three
effects all test the influence of performance on networks, and all are insignificant in the
final model, as shown in Part 1.2 of Table 4. Notably, in an incomplete model that did
not account for the possible opposite direction of causality (the effect of networks on
revenues), clients’ performances appeared to have a positively significant effect on di-
versifying the supplier base. Thus, when the possibility of causality in both directions is
not considered, it appears that good performance is followed by an increase in the
number of suppliers. However, the presented specifications show that the opposite
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proved performance appears to be a consequence of expanded supply chains to a broad
range of first-tier firms rather than the reverse.
Now, we turn to organizational performance, specifically the revenue dynamics (Part
2 of Table 4). The negatively significant baseline linear revenue trend combined with
the negatively significant quadratic effect signifies that previously high RPE firms were
more likely to exhibit worse subsequent performance. This relationship does not appear
in the ROS models.
Having controlled for potential effects of past performance on current performance
trends, the last part of the model examines the effect of supply networks on firms’ per-
formance based on two alternative specifications. The topological specification exam-
ines whether the number of suppliers influences the performance trend. The result is
positively significant for RPE (0.101) but close to zero for ROS (−0.002). The ROS esti-
mate is not significantly different from zero despite the small standard error associated
with this estimate. Approximate 95% confidence intervals calculated as the estimate ±
1.96* standard error for the additional effect of each supplier on the log odds of per-
formance increase in terms of RPE and ROS are 0.036 to 0.166 and −0.025 to 0.022,
respectively. We can say with reasonably high precision that while a wider range of
suppliers increases RPE, it does not increase ROS. This result contradicts the second
structural embeddedness hypothesis (H2).
The flow specification tests whether the performance of the suppliers has an impact on
clients’ performance. This specification produces negatively significant results for RPE,
suggesting that obtaining supplies from high-RPE firms has a negative effect on the
assembler’s RPE over the long term. The estimate for ROS is of a similar magnitude in ab-
solute value but positive. However, the standard error associated with the ROS estimate is
higher, and we cannot confidently state whether suppliers’ ROS has an effect on clients’
ROS. This result contradicts the third structural embeddedness hypothesis (H3).
Overall, the combined results for performance in terms of RPE and ROS suggest that
firms that diversified and increased the number of their direct partners were able to
produce and sell more units at their original margins rather than eliminating waste and
adding more value per a unit of production by accessing new suppliers.
Discussion and practical implications
It is directly observable that the largest Japanese manufacturers increased the number of
direct supply connections with one another during this period and, as a result, increased
supply network density across the industry. However, stochastic actor-oriented modeling
did not reveal any particular preference for creating and maintaining dense connections
within separate network cliques, which would be expected if keiretsu considerations had
continued to constrain procurement strategies. The negatively significant and insignificant
estimates of those effects representing transitive closure in triads contrast with findings
from other network studies and, in particular, with the positively significant tendencies
toward closure uncovered by the same methods on the same type of data for the largest
Japanese firms from all industries (Matous and Todo 2014). In the wake of recent scandals
regarding collusion among suppliers and price fixing in the automobile industry (Shirouzu
and Shiraki 2014), it is plausible that Japanese assemblers and pre-assemblers are acces-
sing diverse groups of suppliers to enable the shifting of business if necessary. These
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modularization – which allows for direct substitution of parts from different suppliers –
has become prevalent in the automobile industry (Corswant and Fredriksson 2002).
Strong long-term relationships are less useful when dealing with substitutable modular
components (Hoetker et al. 2007, Novak and Eppinger 2001).
Despite the fact that disintermediation decreases the number of vertical steps in the
supply chain, and supplier diversification decreases exposure to common risks (Babich
et al. 2007; Wan and Beil 2009), quality control and safety assurance may become more
challenging in the new, more fluid environment of production networks. This new
challenge may prove particularly demanding for Japanese automakers with extremely
slim procurement departments. Our finding that car manufacturers seek hub suppliers
across keiretsu boundaries resonates with the concerns voiced by a white paper from
the Japanese Ministry of Trade, Economy, and Industry (METI 2011). This white paper,
which was published soon after the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011, reported that
manufacturing procurement in Japan has acquired a “diamond structure,” characterized
by the concentration of supply links on certain key original producers of parts and
materials. The implication of the new macro-structure, which resulted from the micro-
processes analyzed in this paper, is that negative temporary shocks can now propagate
throughout entire supply networks regardless of keiretsu boundaries when such
suppliers suffer damage.
The findings of the negative influence of suppliers’ RPE on clients’ RPE and the
positive influence of the number of suppliers on clients’ RPE merit attention. Sup-
pliers may have high RPE if they do not engage in labor-intensive production of
the parts they are selling. According to the former vice-executive director of
Toyota, this description fits the typical keiretsu first-tier suppliers (Shirouzu
2015). Toyota and the other major Japanese assemblers that followed the Toyota
method have traditionally engaged in business only with a small number of per-
manent first-tier suppliers and have expanded production only through first-tier
suppliers by allowing them to procure higher volumes of materials from other
manufacturers and to resell them to Toyota (Wada 1992). Although such keiretsu
arrangements have long been considered the source of the high competitiveness
of Japanese manufacturers (Aoki 1990; Dyer 1996), the results of this paper over-
all suggest the following: (1) Japanese automakers may be moving away from this
strategy by bypassing intermediaries, reaching across network cliques, and expand-
ing the number of their direct suppliers; (2) this strategy enables them better to
ramp-up production compared to the originally preferred exclusive procurement
through a few designated intermediates. Specifically, the present method enables
us to observe that diversification of supply networks led to increased revenues per
employee, as opposed to increased demand followed by an expansion of the
supply base.
From the topological perspective, these findings relate to opinions in the organizational
literature on “the dark side of social capital,” which note that networks may impede the
performance of actors who are “imprisoned” in old, ineffective relations (Gargiulo and
Benassi 2000). The results are also in line with Burt’s position on social capital as an out-
come of reaching to diverse cliques across “structural holes” (Burt 1995) rather than
bonding within one’s own clique (Coleman 1990).
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has demonstrated how interorganizational networks may lead to the homogenization of
practices (Davis and Greve 1997). Furthermore, based on the view that, within Japanese
business groups, high-performing organizations pull forward low-performing partners by
risk sharing and revenue redistribution (Khanna and Yafeh 2005), we would assume that
partnering with high performers has positive implications for productivity.
The present method uncovered an opposite case of interorganizational network
influence: the studied corporations tended to diverge from their partners in terms
of revenues per employee. This may be a case of networks being a source of het-
erogeneity of practices (organizations can outsource less-productive, labor-intensive
activities if they find suitable partners for these tasks), and such “negative diffu-
sion” effects can be uncovered with the introduced method, while controlling for
the effects of organizational agency.
Importantly, the ROS analysis showed that the increase in revenues through the
described changes in supply change management is not accompanied by increasing
margins. The most likely interpretation of the results is that reaching a wider range of
suppliers enabled the successful automakers to increase the number of units sold per
employee rather than increasing the value added per unit. Although such reforms may
catalyze business expansion, restructuring interorganizational links does not suffice to
increase operational efficiency. Intraorganizational process improvement cannot be
neglected if the goal is to increase the value added for each unit of production. Rigor-
ous methods are needed to distinguish when interorganizational network structure
matters and when it does not.
Closure: too much of a good thing?
Industrial production structures are built bottom-up from interactions among individual
organizations that require one another’s material and non-material resources. Individual
interorganizational relationships, from which the structure of the entire industrial produc-
tion system emerges, have been explained in terms of social context (Granovetter 1985),
knowledge and organizational learning (Ahmadjian and Lincoln 2001; Podolny et al.
1996), status (Podolny 1993), trust (Bradach and Eccles 1989; Gulati 1995), transaction
costs (Jones 1997), and market and hierarchies (Simon 1991; Williamson 1991).
Contrary to the structural embeddedness hypotheses, within the presently analyzed
sample and time frame, more embedded firms were less successful, and the whole sys-
tem moved toward less embeddedness. There is a limit to which strong ties benefit
organizational performance (Todo et al. 2016). When a certain limit of embeddedness
is crossed, the flow of new knowledge into the network decreases, feelings of obligation
override economic considerations, and change becomes difficult (Glasmeier 1991; Uzzi
1996). In such a situation, switching to ties with less mutual obligations enables pro-
ducers to economically maintain more links scattered across the market among actors
who may provide access to new resources and information (Uzzi and Lancaster 2003).
The present analysis suggests that Japanese automakers have found themselves on the
side of too much embeddedness, corrected for it, and benefited from that.
Although the term “organizational network” was traditionally reserved for embedded
cliquish systems of interorganizational relations, systems of fluid and diffused market
relations can also be analyzed as networks. It is possible to understand how
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ways in which the activities of each organization aggregate at the collective level due to
novel dynamic approaches that connect the micro and macro levels (Ahuja et al. 2011).
The argument for shifting the analytical focus of interorganizational research
from individual interactions to the broader micro-mechanism from which the com-
plex macro patterns of interorganizational resource exchange emerge is not new
(Bradach and Eccles 1989). However, the transition has not been fully possible with
traditional analytical methods because of the endogenous character of mutually
interdependent changes of interorganizational relationships. Organizations form one
another’s dynamically changing environment and may influence one another’s per-
formance in unexpected ways. Every new relationship modifies the existing
network, prompting an endogenous dynamic between organizational action and
network structure (Gulati and Gargiulo 1999). Empirical research could not until
recently realistically address this complexity and instead treated networks only as
either dependent or independent variables because of the lack of suitable longitu-
dinal data and dynamic modeling methods (Ahuja et al. 2011).
Focusing on “network microdynamics” (Ahuja et al. 2011), i.e., dynamic micro-
structures of choices that individual organizations systematically make regarding their
partnerships with other organizations, we illustrated one way to develop models that
realistically explain interorganizational network and organizational performance coevo-
lution. The introduced models integrate the analysis of organizational agency and struc-
ture and enable both structuralist and connectionist approaches to the analysis of
network consequences. We believe that novel methods, such as those presented here,
will enable researchers to better understand real-world interactions among organiza-
tions and their consequences.
Appendix
Introduction to stochastic actor-oriented models
Stochastic actor-oriented models are a special type of Agent-Based Model (ABM). One of
the distinguishing features of these models is that standard ABMs cannot typically be used
for analyzing empirical data but instead are used to explore stylized, hypothetical what-if
scenarios (Fioretti 2012). Moreover, whereas ABMs also produce network structures of
agents’ interactions, such structures are normally impossible to validate with real-world
data, which impedes the acceptance of ABMs in organizational research.
Stochastic network models are used to analyze binary network data, which are becom-
ing increasingly available and can address substantively important issues, such as the pres-
ence or absence of interorganizational partnerships. Stochastic actor-oriented models
begin with a real network and a real distribution of actor characteristics at time 1 and, by
iterative simulations, work to find stochastic “rules” of actors’ behavior and performance
changes that will lead the network to restructure step-by-step into the shape observed at
time 2. The process of searching for the “rules” underlying actors’ behavior consists of
specifying a variety of theoretically meaningful effects in the model, which are introduced
in the next sub-section, and estimating the strength of the effects to lead the evolution of
the network at time 1 to a network that fits the observed network at time 2 in terms of its
micro-characteristics (such as the number of closed triangles). The strength of the effects
corresponds to the probability that an actor will create and maintain ties in the direction
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ity at time 2 in terms of macro-characteristics that were not directly fit in the iterative
simulations. Thus, the model is validated at both the micro-level of agents’ interactions
and at the macro-level of the structures generated. This enables a level of realism un-
attainable by the vast majority of ABMs (Fioretti 2012).
Stochastic actor-oriented models were originally applied to directed expressive net-
works of individuals, such as friendships within organizations (Schulte et al. 2012). We
argue that the assumptions of these models regarding the evolution of directed net-
works are suitable for networks of resource exchange among organizations. In the case
of supply networks, a link from A to B means that A chooses B as a supplier (By con-
trast, in the case of friendship networks, a link from A to B is interpreted as A “nomin-
ating” B for friendship, the meaning of which is slightly less straightforward).
Another important aspect of stochastic actor-oriented modeling is that actors
quantify the potential value of links to all other actors in the dataset at every step.
While this assumption may make models of informal interpersonal networks within
large groups of people less realistic (employees of large organizations may not
frequently re-assess all other employees for potential friendship), it is much more
plausible that procurement managers compare the pros and cons of all available
suppliers.
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